Let's get physical

Here's something that just popped into my mind and started to annoy the crap outta me:


Generally, when I divide physical and non-physical things, I apply some conditions to determine which is which. I can't observe non-physical (abstract) things, such as good, bad, work, sexual frustration, &c.; but I can observe the physical things of which they are attributes: a good book, a bad pizza, someone doing work, DF being sexually frustrated, &c.. Some things I can't actually observe with my naked senses, but they are physical things, nonetheless, e.g., x-rays, colours and sounds of a higher frequency than the human senses are sensible to, subatomic particles, &c., but the essential difference is (at least, this is what I take it to be) that they're actually physically there: they're made of atoms and molecules that can be measured and tested for, and could be seen with the right equipment, no matter how small or nebulous they are.


Then I wondered if the human mind could be physical, consisting of zero- (or very small) mass particles that we have, as yet, no means of testing for or reasons to suspect, produced by the brain.


Then I wondered: so what is physical? If I can point to it, it's probably physical, right? Cause a thing is always a something, never a nothing; and we can always point to a something that is existentially manifest, and if this is so, that thing is a something and not a nothing; so, if I can see it, there must be something to see.


Then I thought: what the hell is a vacuum? Even if we can't achieve a perfect vacuum, what is it we're seeing when something tends towards absolute vacuum? The amount of somethingness as opposed to nothingness? If we can see the nothingness, then it must be something, and not nothing...


Then I thought: but something can't actively produce a something that is a nothing; and nothing can come from nothing; so do physical neurochemical reactions produce a physical change in the mind through the brain? Or is everything immaterial? Can anything produce something unlike itself in that respect? I couldn't produce something physical by mere mental exertion alone; and I can't see how something physical could actually have an altering (rather than limiting) effect on something entirely non-physical, 'cause how would that work? Isn't every abstract thing just an attribute of something physical, that produces no change in the thing itself, while the physical thing can change from one abstract attribute to another, but ultimately have no affect on any of them? And if the mind is non-physical, how do physical things affect and/or produce it? If the mind is a physical thing, does it have particles? And if it's not, what the hell is it and what does that imply? If it is an immaterial entity, which simply observes through the brain and is limited in its capacity thereby (allowing for things like drunkenness and emotions), where did it come from? And why just the brain? If it can somehow choose that for itself, there's something spooky going on; and if it can't, who can say that whatever is going on in here isn't going on in absolutely everything, but isn't expressible by those things, and may not sense or think (if this is purely dictated by neurological phenomenon) things? But if that's true, viz., that the brain is responsible for thinking and feeling, where does that leave mind? What does mind do that distinguishes it from brain? Nothing? Is there mind, in that case?


What's the deal with the mind? :???:

 

Protein structures used to be found by crystallising the protein, (tricky), then shining light through the crystal and analysing the refraction pattern to figure out the protein's molecular structure (even trickier).

That's how I think of consciousness/mind. It's there, it's structured, it exists in molecular form with perfect logic and structure, BUT we can only measure it by the abstract projections it creates.

Thus, good, bad, ugly, pretty, all have underlying physical causes.

 

The method for finding protein structures (by definition) was a method to find the structure. If our physical senses were unlimited, couldn't we see it?

If we mean the same thing by ‘molecular form’, then couldn't we model a ‘mind molecule’ like we model photons or gravitons (or tachyons!) as things that are actually there?

Good, bad, &c., of course have underlying causes; but I don't see that these causes are the causes of the existence of the concepts themselves.

 

Are we getting physical or abstract?

In my mind, it's just two different language systems for describing the same phenomena.

As for mind molecule, speaking physically, there are lots, forming the lego of the brain, but I realise you mean some kind of pure 'cogiton' which is made of the very substance of mind.

 

If you just made up the term ‘cogiton’, then I absolutely congratulate you on a stroke of pure brilliance!

On topic, yes, that's exactly what I mean. The above mentioned problems seem to result from a hypothesis either way...

 

Yes I did, thanks very much.

 

As usual, I only understood about a third of what wayne-baby wrote. But the answer to "What's the deal with the mind?" is that it is not a physical thing. It is a side effect. An emergent phenomenon.

An analogy would be ocean waves. The ocean is made of water molecules, which stick together in a watery way. Waves are something that we observe the water doing. We can measure the height of the waves and model their movements and interaction, and they are affected by land masses and other physical objects. But the wave itself is not a physical thing - really there are only water molecules bouncing around in ways that resemble waves.

The mind is like that.

 

I don't think it needs to be pointed out that asserting something to be the case and shewing its verisimiltude are two different things. For example, if someone were to post the contrary of what Smuel said, in the same manner as he did, there would be no reason to lean towards either claim, as they're both simply conjecture and neither argues for its case.

I'd simply like to point out that (as far as I know) things like waves, velocity, oscillations cannot actually be touched or seen as things in themselves, but they are actually measures of physical things, just as we cannot hold height in our hands, but it is a description of something in terms of something else. The wave is the name given to the material phenomenon of a traveling disturbance through space and time (or some such definition), and we can describe the conditions that make up the existence of a wave; however, I don't see that you've shewn that mind is a similar phenomenon, in that you don't (as of yet) claim to understand its precise relation to the brain in the same way that I'm sure you could describe a wave in terms of fundamental physical phenomena. We often define a wave in terms of what actually happens physically, describing a state which itself is an inert concept (just as we'd say that the idea of good remains static and independent of any good things, and is only manifestly realized through them), but I can't imagine what state could be described for an active, autonomous mind.

 

I'd simply like to point out that (as far as I know) things like minds, thoughts, memories cannot actually be touched or seen as things in themselves, but they are actually measures of physical things, just as we cannot hold vision in our hands, but it is a description of something in terms of something else. The mind is the name given to the material phenomenon of traveling patterns of neural activity through a network (or some such definition), and we can describe the conditions that make up the existence of a mind;

There you go.

 

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I would ask how it is that you define mind as the measure of a physical thing. I don't suppose an exercise of free will or an a priori thought or logical deduction to have been caused materially, and I would question what you seem to take as apodeictic, viz., that physical events produce (rather than prompt or encourage) thought, by their own steam alone (if this were the case, you would need to admit either that these processes are determined by physical events, or that we can control these processes somehow; and the latter choice presupposes an immaterial, autonomous mind, while the former admits of an inability to make choices and decisions). Though pain and emotions, &c., can be correlated with the relevant neural activity, I don't see how this connects to the immaterial concepts themselves, as I'm sure you agree that reproducing the very same reactions in the brain of a dead individual would not result in their feeling anything, and that an observation of these events would not lead one (by its information alone) to infer the existence of immaterial thought or feeling*. I would argue that we feel by these material events, which in turn are caused by some material cause; but I don't see that either of these events is the same thing as the feeling itself. Further, I would point out that I believe that you would find it difficult to rationalize your active mental engagement in coming up with what you believe to be an answer as a description of something material in terms of something else.

If the mind were the material phenomenon of traveling patterns of neural activity, it would imply that the mind is material, and can only be affect by material things (as the definition of an abstract concept itself does not exert any physical force). Therefore, I wonder how you describe the immaterial processes of choice and reasoning, as these are not subject to material causation, and do exist. Any answer you give to such a claim (that they exist) affirms the point (and so a negation of it is self-defeating). Unless you rely on absolute determinism (and therefore reject free will and all moral concepts or any responsibility), I fail to see how one could account for the recalling of memories for no reason but one of thought, and I question how any immaterial things occasion you through a material process of firing neurons alone.

 

The sense of smell is tied to memory. My girlfriend says my new vehicle smells like high school, as in a nostalgic memory response. Certain electromagnetic signals created in response to a physical scent molecule alter abstract thought processes in a way to learn a scent, or, to recall one. The mind is made of physical stuff, but the semblance of consciousness is made of extra-physical stuff. Particles and energies we haven't discovered yet. All that remains is a way to describe and quantify them.

 

Just to dispel any ambiguity: I'm saying much the same thing; or rather, not denying it. I agree with the first point (and have mentioned it twice, above, I think), but remain unconvinced, either way, regarding the second.

 

I'm just kinda putting my own spin on it. I do like the word "cogiton."
At first I thought he misspelled cognition, then realized it was a new word.
There are four brain waves produced in the physical brain that are tied to aspects of consciousness. I'd guess that combinations of these waves allow for the healthy functioning of a mind, and that too much of one can lead to delusions. Like Theta Waves; they contribute to the dreaming mind, and allow for hypnagogic imagery. My mind seems to love alpha and theta waves.

 

That's not nostalgia, you just keep having sex in there.

 

How does one have sex in a Toyota Corolla?

 

Now we're trying to convince WS that mind can be reduced to its physical cause while he argues for the existence of pure consciousness. Has the world gone topsy turvy?

You're supposed to be the reductionist versus the mystic, not the other way around!

Illogical, captain.

 

I feel that referring to the mind as patterns of neural activity is both an accurate and concise description, or at the very least, a description that resonates with me. I like daydreaming, music, and other non-concrete (not necessarily abstract) things, but at the end of the day I cannot help but feel that the mind is restricted by some physical, material structure and I find the brain to be the likeliest. I would like to believe that there is something more mysterious and fantastic to describe the mind, but there just isn't. I don't mean to use the term "isn't" as an authority and imply that other views are wrong, only that this is the view that comforts me.

I believe that everything can be observed and measured physically, that there is a chemical formula for fear, and that a memory, thought, or idea is simply a path in an organism's brain.

The defining of the mind is a difficult pursuit, and seldom a meaningful one. I doubt that fully understanding the mind will change how it is used on a day-to-day basis. I have a mind, I value it, and even if it ends up being something as mundane as an electrical path in my brain, it's still wonderful.

 

Push the passenger seat back and go either cowgirl or reverse cowgirl.



Can we ban wayne from creating any more posts containing bat shit crazy bastardized hybrids of philosophy and quantum physics?

 

We should probably define some terms otherwise we'll just talk at cross purposes. I usually use the word "brain" to mean the collection of neurons in your head, and the word "mind" to encompass thought, feeling, memory, consciousness and all the other attributes that are involved in the experience of living.

I assert that the mind is a byproduct of the brain. It seems pretty obvious to me. I mean, people have looked inside other people's heads and there's nothing in there other than a brain. What other mechanism could there be for a mind's existence? I admit that it can be hard to believe that the plethora of human experience is just an emergent property of neurons firing, but there isn't any evidence that it is anything else, and sadly "I find it hard to believe" is not a sufficient argument against the hypothesis.

If you're actually arguing something more complex then I'm afraid you've lost me. The fact that you think that "living" neural activity in the mind of a "dead" person means that they wouldn't "feel" anything leads me to think that you are using different definitions from me. I would say that neural activity IS the mind, so the point of being dead is that there is no longer any of that. If you could re-kindle it, then the person would be alive again for as long as it lasted. However, if you're selectively stimulating only a part of their brain (e.g. the part responsible for registering sensation in their left leg) then they would not necessarily be conscious of it, at which point the line between being alive and dead becomes a bit blurred.

Neural activity results in a mind. To go back to the wave analogy - even though we can model a wave as a phenomenon in and of itself, without regard to any molecular foundation, any given water molecule is just reacting based on its neighbours, and is not aware of the "wave" that we observe travelling through it. Similarly, patterns of neurons firing result in a higher-order phenomenon of perceptions, choices, etc. There doesn't need to be a direct material connection between the two. Although, technically, there is, but the equations that govern them are completely separate, and trying to express the mind in terms of individual neurons firing is as pointless as trying to express waves in terms of individual water molecules.